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IntroductIon
This chapter brings together insights of parallel efforts to map out the 
structures and bodies providing evidence to inform health policy in the six 
GRIP-Health case study countries covered in this volume of work. More 
specifically, it reflects on the roles of Ministries of Health in each country, 
and the systems of evidence advice that provide policy relevant evidence to 
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these Ministries. This chapter describes how Ministries of Health have 
been mandated to act as stewards of populations’ health according to the 
World Health Organization. We argue that this mandate extends to them 
having (at least partial) responsibility for ensuring relevant evidence and 
information informs health policy decisions. The chapter then discusses 
the need to consider evidence advisory systems serving Ministry needs, 
particularly considering whether or how such systems work to provide 
relevant and salient information in a timely manner to key decision points 
in the policy making process. Insights from our six cases are presented to 
illustrate the structural and practical differences which exist between evi-
dence advisory systems and how, at certain times, key health decisions may 
in fact lie outside ministerial authority. These divergent experiences high-
light a range of analytical challenges when considering the provision of 
evidence to inform health decisions from an institutional perspective. The 
following chapter continues the discussion with country case studies and 
comparative reflections on the use of evidence within government bodies 
outside Ministries of Health – particularly in the legislature and judiciary.
MInIstrIes as stewards of HealtH  
and HealtH evIdence
A key debate in global health over the last two decades has concerned the 
role of the state in the health sector and in health systems governance 
(WHO 2000, p. 119; Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis 2000, p. 732; Reich 
2002; Alvarez-Rosete 2008). This has grown in part from a renewed focus 
on the importance of health systems for improving population health, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the increasing diversity of decision- 
making forums and agencies involved in healthcare provision and imple-
mentation (Durán et  al. 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2012). (Dodgson 
et al. 2002) These changes have led to a shift in the vocabulary used by 
scholars. The term ‘governance’ began to replace ‘government’ within 
political science discourse since the 1990s, reflecting the decentred posi-
tion of central government in public policy in many countries (Rhodes 
1996, 1997; Kooiman 2000; Pierre 2000; Rosenau 1995; Stoker 1998).1 
These changes have occurred in parallel with the growing number of calls 
to ensure that health services, and wider health sector, planning is informed 
1 For overviews of this shift in terminology and focus, see: (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; 
Richards and Smith 2002; Piere and Peters 2000; Davies and Keating 2000; Kjaer 2011, 
2004).
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by the rigorous use of evidence, with a growing body of literature that has 
engaged with strategies to improve the uptake or use of evidence (c.f. van 
Kammen et al. 2006; LaRocca et al. 2012; Lavis et al. 2010). Yet in the 
changing health sector landscape, questions arise about whose role or 
responsibility it is to ensure health policy is informed by evidence.
Recent decades have also seen widespread debate about the capacity of 
the state to deliver policy outcomes and its right to intervene in the lives of 
the citizens it governs (Richards and Smith 2002; Bell and Hindmoor 
2009). This shifting conceptualization of government as governance has 
also occurred in the arena of health (Dodgson et al. 2002; Kickbusch 2002; 
Lewis et  al. 2006). Thus questions have been raised about the locus of 
political power in contemporary societies and whether the state enjoys the 
same degree of control and power over health systems and policy as in the 
past. (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Bevir 2010; Rhodes 1997) In contempo-
rary health systems, the number of old and new actors and institutions has 
multiplied, the boundaries between the public and private sectors have 
become more blurred, and central authorities’ control over a much more 
complex policy process may now be challenged (Lewis et al. 2006; Alvarez-
Rosete 2007; Saltman et al. 2011). The inherent complexity this implies 
means that such systems can only be governed through processes of steer-
ing, coordination and goal-setting for the range of different stakeholders 
involved and by developing a wide range of tools and strategies to this end.
The World Health Organization (WHO) introduced and championed 
the concept of stewardship of health systems as an essential government 
function in the year 2000 World Health Report (hereafter WHR 2000), 
which was devoted to the understanding, functioning and performance 
health systems. The report took a broad view of health systems as including: 
“all the organizations, institutions and resources that are devoted to pro-
ducing health actions. [Continuing:] A health action is defined as any effort, 
whether in personal health care, public health services or through inter-
sectoral initiatives, whose primary purpose is to improve health (p. xi)”.
The WHR 2000 is widely held up by the health community as a key 
document championing and reinvigorating the focus on health systems, 
with ministries of health being seen as health system stewards. Many subse-
quent WHO reports and policies have aimed at strengthening systems as 
well as the institutional mechanisms for governing them (WHO 2003, 
2007, 2008). Similarly, WHO regional offices have had the intertwined 
topics of health systems development and state governance roles at the heart 
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of their discussions (WHOROE 2008; Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012) – also 
see (McQueen et al. 2012).
The terms governance and stewardship have often been used as syn-
onyms by those working in the health field, yet stewardship implies a par-
ticular mandate, and ultimate responsibility, for population health that is 
reflected when the WHO states:
The ultimate responsibility for the overall performance of a country’s health 
system lies with government, which in turn should involve all sectors of 
society in its stewardship […] The health of the people is always a national 
priority: government responsibility for it is continuous and permanent. 
Ministries of health must therefore take on a large part of the stewardship of 
health systems. (WHO 2000, p. xiv)
According to the WHR 2000, such responsibility is exercised over three 
distinct dimensions of stewardship (p. 122):
• Formulating health policy – defining the vision and direction;
• Exerting influence – approaches to regulation;
• Collecting and using intelligence.
Whilst the first two components indicate a responsibility to oversee 
health policy and the conduct of health actors, the third dimension – ‘col-
lecting and using intelligence’ – captures many of the common ideas about 
the use of policy relevant information to inform health decisions.
InstItutIonal systeMs of evIdence advIse  
for HealtH PolIcy
Ministries of Health may thus be seen as having a mandate over decisions 
affecting the health of the people, as well as over the use of evidence and 
information to guide those decisions. However, effective utilisation of evi-
dence requires a conduit through which it can reach relevant decision- 
makers at times when such information can be useful. Thus applying wider 
‘governance’ concepts to the question of evidence use, it becomes clear 
that Ministries will not necessarily take it upon themselves to gather and 
analyse all policy relevant evidence (although some of them may try to). 
Rather, they can serve as the stewards of health evidence by overseeing and 
maintaining the institutional arrangements in place which serve to provide 
policy-relevant evidence.
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Ministries can rely on a more or less formalised network of bodies and 
groups to serve as the providers of policy-relevant evidence (Nutley et al. 
2007; Parkhurst 2017) – networks we refer to as ‘evidence advisory sys-
tems’, which can be seen to reflect a specific form of the broader concept 
of ‘policy advisory systems’ within the public policy literature. According 
to Hustedt and Veit (2017), “The concept of policy advisory systems 
focuses on the country-specific organization and institutionalization of 
policy advice. It refers to an interlocking set of actors with a unique con-
figuration in each sector and jurisdiction, who provide information, 
knowledge, and recommendations for actions to policy-makers” (p. 42).
One of the first authors to explicitly discuss policy advisory bodies from 
an institutional perspective was John Halligan (1995) who explored the 
location of the body providing advice (within the public service, internal 
to the government, or external) and reflected on the level of government 
control each might entail. Halligan notes that there is no consensus as to 
the ‘best’ structure for policy advice, but highlights some of the different 
potential issues that might be raised by differing systems, including the 
level of independence of the advisory bodies or the level of public consul-
tation involved. He proposes three principles that might be seen as central 
to a good advisory system, however: the provision of multiple sources of 
advice; the flexibility to be able to choose a mix of advisors and processes 
appropriate to a particular issue; and an explicit concern with the effective-
ness of advice.
More recently, scholars have questioned whether Halligan’s focus on 
location of advice is necessarily the best factor to consider when judging 
policy advisory systems. Craft and Howlett (2012), for instance, argue 
that this focus may ignore a number of other key concerns to those study-
ing advisory systems, including the content of the policy advice itself, 
which can have important implications for the kinds of decisions advice 
that is being provided. Other scholars have started to investigate policy 
advisory systems in greater depth, but according to Hustedt and Veit 
(2017), much of this work has focussed on western democracies, looking 
at questions such as the externalisation of advice or politicisation of advice, 
with a large number of other policy-relevant questions remaining unad-
dressed. In the health sector, Koon and colleagues (Koon et al. 2013) have 
more specifically discussed the importance of ‘embeddedness’ of health 
policy and systems research to inform health policy decisions; with 
 embeddedness reflecting the centrality and networked links these forms of 
research have in various government systems.
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However, the explicit normative goal of Ministries of Health to serve in 
a stewardship role to improve population health provides a useful lens by 
which to analyse evidence advisory systems. Indeed, while high level legis-
latures and political bodies may see their ultimate goals continually being 
debated or changed as political priorities shift, Ministries of Health typi-
cally have a fairly commonly agreed set of goals that can be used to reflect 
on how evidence advisory systems in place work to serve those needs or 
achieve health sector goals.
Indeed, stakeholders calling for increased or improved uses of evidence 
in health policy typically make such calls on the basis of a set of (stated or 
unstated) assumptions. First, the goals of health policy to improve popula-
tion health – primarily though reducing morbidity and mortality, extend-
ing life expectancy, or decreasing health inequalities – are taken as given by 
many public health advocates. Furthermore, the particular emphasis on 
scientific evidence is based on an underlying assumption that more rigor-
ous and systematic uses of evidence are likely to lead to greater effective-
ness and efficiency than piecemeal or scientifically flawed uses of evidence 
(Chalmers 2003; Chalmers et  al. 2002; Parkhurst 2017). Yet efficiency 
gains of this nature further require that policy-relevant evidence is pro-
duced and reaches the appropriate decision making body in a timely man-
ner in order to be usable. These criteria provide us with a lens through 
which to evaluate the structures, functions and effectiveness of evidence 
advisory bodies serving Ministries of Health.
HealtH decIsIons and needs
The public policy literature recognises that the term ‘policy’ can refer to a 
range of concepts, from projects and programmes, to sector-specific plans, 
to broad statements of intent (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Policy is also 
rarely the responsibility of a single body; rather, policy decisions affecting 
health take place at difference levels of governance (i.e. sub-national, 
national and supra-national) across a range of state and non-state decision 
making forums. As such, the most relevant forms of evidence will vary 
across policy issues and decision types of policy-making location.
However, there are some types of decisions common to many coun-
tries’ health sectors for which research evidence is often held as critical, 
and over which Ministries of Health typically are seen to have authority. 
This allows a basic typology of decision types to provide a starting point to 
explore how evidence advisory systems work to provide policy-relevant 
evidence. For example:
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• Public health and health promotion: Decisions of this kind are usu-
ally done at a high level as they affect large segments of the popula-
tion. A broad range of evidence will thus be relevant to such decisions, 
including epidemiological, economic, social attitude, and other data 
which speak to relevant policy concerns.
• Health sector planning and priority setting: These decisions are con-
cerned with setting national goals and priority setting across the sec-
tor. They can also involve allocation of resources between local 
health concerns. Relevant evidence forms can thus include popula-
tion health data, resource health technology appraisals/assessments 
(HTA), or health services research.
• Health systems and services management: In addition to new policy 
decisions and priority setting, Ministries of Health also typically 
make ongoing decisions related to the management and functioning 
of the health system. Relevant evidence can include routine data col-
lected from facilities or surveys, operations research, implementation 
research, or other programmatic evidence.
• Programmatic decision making: What many authors refer to as health 
policy decisions fall within the remit of specialised agencies, such as 
programmes dedicated to individual conditions (cancer, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, etc.). In particular these decisions can involve the choice of 
interventions to pursue, often with a fixed budget to allocate. 
Decisions of this nature can require evidence both about efficacy or 
cost effectiveness of available options, but equally can be informed 
by locally generated data (e.g. routine data from surveillance or facil-
ity information).
Even within these broad categories, decision making for health can 
take place at different levels within government hierarchies, with author-
ity for decisions, and entry points for evidence, resting in national level 
bodies and sub-national bodies. In different country settings the various 
decision types listed above might be addressed at any level or may cut 
across more than one. Moreover, they may be shaped by supra-national 
policy regimes (such as those of the European Union). Movements 
towards de- centralisation might also lead to the shifting of decision-
making from national levels to lower levels. Such realities, however, allow 
consideration of whether systems of evidentiary advice are well aligned 
with the decision authority structures in a given setting. There can also 
be important considerations on the ways that national evidence systems 
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link to influential non-state decision makers (e.g. development partners 
in low and middle income settings, or corporatist bodies with authority 
in health decision making fora).
country case studIes
In each case study country, members of the GRIP-Health research pro-
gramme attempted to map out the key health policy decision making bod-
ies, and the sources of evidence in the country that inform health decisions. 
These mappings allowed reflection on how the evidence advisory system 
in each country might work, or face challenges, in aligning sources of 
policy relevant evidence with the policy needs in each setting. The sub- 
sections below summarise some of the key findings from each case. This is 
then followed by a discussion of cross cutting issues and themes seen from 
multiple settings.
Ghana
In Ghana, the Ministry of Health (MoH) provides overall policy direction 
for all stakeholders and players in the health sector, and approves health 
decisions related to specific health system issues, including health system 
strengthening and, at times, programme or disease specific interventions. 
The Ghana Health Service (GHS) is an autonomous Executive Agency of 
the MoH which has been delegated the responsibility to manage and oper-
ate all public health facilities (except for three teaching hospitals); while 
the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) is also the primary body 
which decides on the package of services available to many citizens.
Ghana has established some formal internal bodies to provide evidence 
to these agencies. Within the GHS, the Policy, Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation division and the Research & Development division are both 
tasked with evidence generation. The GHS also hosts the Centre for 
Health Information Management which includes the District Health 
Information Management System, through which routine health data 
(administrative, demographic and clinical) is provided from local facilities 
to districts and upwards to central health management levels. In the MoH 
there is also a Research, Statistics and Information Management 
Directorate and a MoH-based Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
division as well which are responsible for generating evidence and advising 
the MoH.  The GHS also directs three regional research centres that 
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 conduct health services and systems research within their designated areas 
to guide national decision making.
In these ways, Ghana appears to have a well-aligned bureaucracy pro-
viding relevant research and evidence to key decision making bodies. 
However we did identify some challenges and further needs as well. First, 
as a lower-middle income country, there were some expected capacity 
limitations in terms of volume of research and population of experts to 
provide relevant evidence. Furthermore, while the NHIA is tasked with 
choosing the services covered by the National Health Insurance Scheme, 
the GHS decides the NHIS charges at each facility. Interviews and partici-
patory observations at the annual business meeting with international 
partners in November 2015, identified a latent rivalry between the two 
government agencies due to conflicting interests in generating and using 
evidence to inform decisions as purchaser (NHIA) and provider (GHS) of 
health services.
At the time of research, there was not any formalised or fully agreed 
system of Health Technology Appraisal (HTA) in place to guide decisions 
on health services provided across the health sector, although there was 
some movement towards using HTA to inform individual decisions. 
Funding for many health programmes is also reliant on international 
donors (so called ‘development partners’), which was said to lead to verti-
cal programming independent of any evidence of local priorities or need. 
International donors were also said to use their own systems and bodies of 
evidence at times.
Reliance on development partners, who can retain decision making 
authority in some ways, can thus pose challenges to rationalising evidence 
use and ensuring local stewardship of evidence advisory systems. On the 
one hand, donors obviously provide finance for health services, and will no 
doubt at times be undertaking evaluations of programmes that can generate 
policy relevant evidence. Yet, such systems are external to national struc-
tures, and thus risk establishing parallel systems of evidence advisory out-
side those under the control of, and at the service of, national authorities.
Finally, it was identified that the Ghanaian Parliament had a remit to 
make decisions around health financing nationally and other health 
related legislation through the Parliament select committee on health. 
However, local interviewees noted limited influence of this committee 
due to financial constraints prohibiting its ability to gather information or 
undertake inquiries as needed. Also, the involvement of local MPs into 
the two annual business meetings with development partners is limited, 
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with consequent inability to obtain relevant information on future health 
interventions and leverage their positions at the moment of approving the 
government budget.
Colombia
Colombia is the second middle income case study country, included yet its 
differences with Ghana illustrate just how context-specific health policy-
making can be. Since the inception of the Colombian health system in 
1993, highly politicised disagreements have been sustained on issues such 
as the financing of the system (insurance versus taxation based); the 
involvement of the private sector; and whether limits can or should be 
placed on the right to health care. Policy debates almost exclusively focus 
on macro/systemic health sector reforms, to the exclusion of many other 
health policy issues.
As an insurance based health system, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, MSPS) primarily steers 
health care by setting the mandatory basic service package (the Plan 
Obligatorio de Salud [POS]) and regulating the system; although it does 
not have a direct managerial input on health care facilities. However, roles 
and authority over these functions have also changed or been assigned (or 
reassigned) between the Ministry and other bodies in recent years. For 
instance from 2007 a Regulatory Commission for Health was set up to 
update the package of health services provided in Colombia, but in 2012 
it was abolished and the Ministry re-assumed this role (Castro 2014).
The health policy decision making process in Colombia also involves a 
range of different institutions across the branches of government as well as 
non-state actors (e.g. civil society organisations, health insurers, service 
providers, academia and professional organisations). The governance of 
the health system is thus extremely fragmented, reflecting the complexity 
of the health system itself (Bernal et al. 2012; Yamin and Parra-Vera 2010). 
Furthermore, the judiciary plays a particularly important role in health 
policymaking in Colombia (as discussed in more depth in Chap. 5) as it 
often serves as the means by which the public challenges insurers on what 
should be included in the package of services.
The Ministry does have a series of organizations ascribed to it with 
responsibilities for evidence provision through their mandate to advise on 
decisions in health, including: the Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS) (the 
National Health Institute); the Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologíca en 
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Salud (IETS) (Institute of Health Technology Assessment); and the 
Instituto Nacional de Vigilancia de Medicinas y Alimentos (INVIMA) 
(National Institute for the Vigilance of Medicines and Food). Yet there is 
no unique central hub of evidence generation in the Ministry; instead, 
each unit and directorate within the Ministry appears to be responsible for 
its own areas of expertise; and these national advisory bodies may thus 
have limited influence given the fragmented governance of decision mak-
ing, providing advice to some decision points but not necessarily others.
Overall, some of the biggest challenges to the use of evidence for health 
policy thus includes the fragmentation of decision making, the politicisa-
tion over fundamental elements of health care provision (diverting time 
and attention away from more specific health service and systems plan-
ning) and the lack of central authority vested in the Ministry of Health and 
Social Protection. In combination, these factors limit how much evidence 
advisory bodies can influence health policy decisions in ‘rational-technical’ 
ways often expected by public health advocates.
Cambodia
Cambodia was selected as one of our low income setting cases at the time 
of research, although today it is classified as ‘lower-middle income’ in 
World Bank rankings. Despite recent economic growth, it still has limited 
state provision of health services. Estimates vary, but survey data suggest 
two-thirds of health spending is financed by consumer out-of-pocket pay-
ments ([Cambodia] National Institute of Statistics Directorate for Health 
2015), with national demographic and health surveys suggesting only 
one-fifth of treatments carried out by the public sector.
The MoH has the mandate to monitor the country’s health status, 
advise central government on health policies and legislation, formulate 
strategies and develop programmes to address the country’s health prob-
lems, and implement, monitor and evaluate all health programmes and 
activities in the country in collaboration with other sectors and agencies. 
There are also numerous national programmes, centres and institutions 
important to the Cambodian health system, many of which are issue spe-
cific in their remit. These include the National Maternal and Child Health 
Centre (NMCH), the National Centre for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and 
STD (NCHADS) and the National Institute of Public Health (NIPH). 
These technical health departments and national centres sit within the 
MoH structure, and can initiate specific health policies or guidelines 
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(Jones and Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 
2013). The Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) was noted to be 
one of the most important other decision making bodies in Cambodia 
affecting health, however, as it is responsible for financing the health sys-
tem, and particularly important for health policy decisions with budgetary 
implications in the country. International development partners (donors) 
are also highly influential in the Cambodian health sector as over half of 
the public budget is funded by aid (approximately 52% of the health bud-
get, as estimated in 2011 (World Bank 2011)). Local respondents further 
noted that research topics are heavily driven by external funders, rather 
than assessments of health policy priorities by local bodies.
Whilst there appears to be a demand for evidence and research in health 
policy-making in Cambodia, including language used within Ministry 
documents of a need for ‘evidence based’ approaches, this demand does 
not appear to be deeply embedded in MoH systems and structures. A 
considerable amount of research is produced in the sector in the form of 
reviews and assessments for specific projects or programmes. This work is 
often conducted by commissioned consultancies, and has been described 
elsewhere by Jones (2013) to be of variable quality. Jones further notes 
concern over the supply of policy-relevant data in the country (Jones and 
Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 2013). Some 
information sources (or documents collecting data) are institutionalised, 
however. For example, the annual operational plan (AOP) process and the 
health management information system (HMIS); although private consul-
tations and treatments (accounting for about 70% of care) are not cap-
tured in the HMIS. Indeed, the Ministry itself has highlighted the need to 
improve the reliability and policy relevance of the system (Cambodia 
Ministry of Health 2008). Furthermore it was reported that the Ministry 
had no way to monitor or gather data from most private providers of 
health services, despite this capturing a majority of treatment in the coun-
try. The domestic research community is also relatively weak in regard to 
health, particularly due to limited funding and the low strategic  importance 
accorded to research by political actors (Jones and Camboida Economic 
Associate Centre for Policy Studies 2013).
In terms of technical bodies, the National Institute for Public Health 
(NIPH) is one of the most notable within the Cambodian system. It is a 
semi-autonomous institute under the MoH tasked to undertake research, 
knowledge translation, and training – although it has reportedly largely 
focused on training, as no budget has been provided for research activities. 
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Given these resource constraints, including limited staffing capacity, the 
NIPH is not currently considered a strong player in the domestic research 
community. However, it does appear to have a clear mandate and institu-
tional position to serve an evidence advisory role.
In terms of donor-funded evidence use, research projects are often 
focussed on programme evaluation. They have often been critiqued for 
lacking coordination, resulting in duplications of efforts and inefficient use 
of resources, and lacking integration in terms of data collection and analy-
sis (Jones and Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 
2013). There are some efforts to coordinate data and evidence to inform 
national level strategic planning, however. In particular, the drafting of the 
Health Strategic Plan, the mid-term review process of the Plan, as well as 
annual performance reviews are supported by consultation mechanisms in 
which data are presented and discussed. Most notable is the Technical 
Working Group for Health, chaired by the Minster of Health, which brings 
together government and development partners to present and discuss 
evidence to inform this high level of sector planning and review.
The evidence advisory system for health policy-making in Cambodia 
thus appears to suffer from limited capacity and a vertical programme ori-
entation  – often driven by sources of funds from outside actors (e.g. 
donors). There is a lack of strategy in the handling of the evidence and 
knowledge base for the health sector, and management and decision- 
making based on research evidence and analysis is limited in both health 
policy-making and service delivery. However, policy makers are aware of 
the need to develop a research agenda for the sector (expressed in inter-
views and seen in MoH documents identifying needed improvements), 
and some MoH working groups have increasingly been giving attention to 
this issue. There are also existing institutional bodies that could serve 
more central or relevant roles in evidence generation or synthesis in the 
future, with greater capacity and integration into planning processes.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia served as our second low income case. The country is officially a 
federation, and the constitution establishes dual jurisdiction over public 
health between the Federal and the Regional governments. However, the 
Federal Ministry of Health has control over the national health policy, 
formulating the national strategic plan for the health sector. Since 1991, 
Ethiopia has made improvements to health care delivery and set the basic 
 MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND THE STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH EVIDENCE 
168 
foundations of a health system, improvements that are recognized by 
some as a success story of health system reform (Downie 2016). In this 
process, the role of health research has been seen to be critical; conse-
quently, Ethiopia has at times made explicit commitments to improving 
the use of evidence in health (c.f. Ethiopian Academy of Science 2013).
Given the limited resources in country, there have been expected ongo-
ing challenges in terms of low research-related technical and human capac-
ity and an absence of strong research priority-setting mechanisms. Yet these 
limitations seem not to have undermined the capacity of the Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMoH) to make decisions in health and enforce com-
mitments with development partners (Downie 2016). Instead, the govern-
ment of Ethiopia appears to have maintained a strong central controlling 
function over the decisions which have been made. Health policymaking in 
Ethiopia appears heavily focussed on centralised planning, and particularly 
draws on routine data sources to inform decisions. Data gathering and anal-
ysis are concentrated in two main national agencies, the Central Statistical 
Agency and the recently reorganised Ethiopian Public Health Institute. 
Data on health facilities are collected at the community level, then reported 
to the district (woreda), regional and national levels. The FMoH then uses 
data to produce indicators that are passed back to lower levels to elaborate 
local health plans (Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health 2014).
The bureaucratic structures in Ethiopia thus appear to be well aligned 
for this collection and review of local data for planning. The Policy and 
Planning Directorate within the FMoH hosts the Health Management 
Information System (HMIS), for instance, which is a key component of 
the system. According to national documents, the HMIS is also used to 
identify funding gaps and priorities in order to inform the need for donor 
assistance (Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health 2014).
Generation and review of other forms of evidence to inform planning 
decisions, however, do show limitations. For example, the Ethiopia Public 
Health Institute serves as a semi-autonomous institution under the 
FMOH and is the technical arm of the FMOH.  Its main tasks are to 
undertake research on priority health and nutrition problems and on pub-
lic health emergencies management. Yet the capacity of this body was said 
to be limited, leading to fairly piecemeal production of policy relevant 
evidence. For example, a representative from the Technology Transfer and 
Research Translation Directorate of EHPI noted that there were very few 
staff to undertake activities, and only a few policy briefs had been pro-
duced to inform decision making at that time.
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It is therefore generally indicated that evidence production and use in 
Ethiopia are still limited, mainly due to insufficient human capacity in 
generating evidence and in the relatively young establishment of the cul-
ture of evidence- informed policy-making (African Health Observatory 
2014). Consolidating and publishing existing evidence for policy-making 
and decision-making has thus been described as limited and unsystematic 
(Gaym 2008). Yet this stands in contrast to the seemingly well established 
and centrally controlled system of planning around routine data sources in 
the country.
England
England represents the first of our high income case study settings. The 
country is well known for its tax funded and state provided National 
Health Service (NHS). Elements of evidence use within the English sys-
tem are also often held up as exemplars of evidence informed policy. In 
particular, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) – 
a non-departmental public body that provides clinical guidelines and 
health technology appraisals for the NHS – has been held up as a role 
model both domestically and internationally. Within England, it has served 
as the inspiration for a set of ‘what works’ centres that aim to emulate the 
health approach to synthesising evidence of interventions to inform poli-
cymaking (UK Government 2013). Globally it has been a template for 
health technology assessment bodies in other countries (Including 
Colombia as noted above, and described by Castro (2014) elsewhere).
The Department (Ministry) of Health has overall responsibility for the 
NHS, public health and social care, within a legislative framework set by 
Parliament. The Department is supported by 26 agencies and public bod-
ies. Of these, 15 are referred to as ‘arm’s-length bodies’, with different 
degrees of independence from government. The remaining bodies are 
advisory non-departmental public bodies, whose role is to assist the 
Department in “evaluating, investigating and supporting policy” and pro-
viding independent scientific expertise (Boyle 2011). The Department is 
also supported by two executive agencies: the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), responsible for regulating medi-
cines, medical devices and blood components for transfusion, and Public 
Health England (PHE), developing public health and health promotion 
policy. Finally, NICE is a non-departmental body that provides national 
guidance and advice for health, public health and social care practitioners, 
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as well as quality standards for the provision and the commissioning of 
these services. This includes the appraisal of new medical technologies 
using principles of cost-effectiveness (NICE 2017). NICE therefore plays 
a key role in defining the package of services available to patients in the 
NHS.
In general, scientific evidence plays a pivotal role in the governance of 
the NHS. There is a substantial volume of health systems, health services 
and health policy research produced in the UK (in addition to clinical 
research and basic sciences) which has led some authors to describe a cul-
ture of evidence use in which the NHS aims to become, a “consistent, 
evidence-based whole (Shergold and Grant 2008, p. 7)” with substantial 
‘absorptive capacity’ for publicly and privately-funded health research 
(Hanney et al. 2010).
The evidence advisory system, however, combines multiple elements. 
In Parliament, select committees play a key role in holding the govern-
ment to account for its decisions, policies, and reforms; and they mostly 
do so in relation to health policy through an assessment of the available 
evidence base. The Department of Health, however, has a history of com-
missioning research on behalf of the NHS, PHE and others, and of col-
laborating with the various government research bodies that fund health 
related research. The National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) was 
created in 2006, and coordinates research efforts to inform the health 
system. Finally, England is a leading market for think tanks, including in 
the health sector. However it has been argued that little is known about 
how such think tanks prioritize topics, fund their research (and the meth-
odologies employed), or influence health policy-making; with calls for 
greater research into their roles and biases in health policy-making (Shaw 
et al. 2014). Despite this, overall the English system has widely been seen 
as a strong example of a coordinated evidence advisory system that 
attempts to institutionalise evidence use in health policy and health system 
governance.
Germany
Germany represents our final case study country and second high income 
setting, but one that looks very different from England in its health system 
structure and broader governance approach. One of the most relevant 
features, perhaps, is how much health decision making takes place outside 
the remit of the Ministry of Health. Germany is a federal parliamentary 
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republic comprised of 16 states (Länder). The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
provides for the separation of powers between the Bund (federal state) and 
the Länder and sets out their respective rights and responsibilities. The 
Basic Law also sets out the general principles that shape health system 
governance, including a commitment to ‘corporatism’  – which broadly 
involves governance through power sharing with major interest groups. 
Responsibilities for health system governance are thus shared by federal, 
states and municipalities, as well as the corporatist self-administration.
Parliamentary decision-making is prepared by, and largely happens in, 
committees. For health policy, two standing committees are most relevant: 
the Health Committee (Gesundheitsausschuss) and the Conciliation 
Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss). Health care legislation, including 
major health care reform, is usually initiated by the federal minister of 
health. The main responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Health is to 
maintain, secure and advance an effective statutory health system 
([Germany] Federal Ministry of Health 2015). The Federal Ministry of 
Health has several ways of steering health and health care policy: develop-
ing legislation, decrees and administrative directives; supervising the pro-
vision of tasks that have been delegated to the self-administration; and 
co-ordinating stakeholders in health system governance in other ways, for 
example, through organising initiatives, establishing committees or pro-
moting other forms of collaborative work.
However, in line with the Basic Law, a large number of decision- making 
and regulatory tasks have been delegated to the organisations of the self- 
administration. At federal level, key corporatist actors are the top organisa-
tions of sickness funds (Spitzenverband der deutschen Krankenkassen), 
representing public payers, the German Hospital Association (Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft) and the federal association of office-based doc-
tors and dentists who deliver services funded by social health insurance 
(Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung). Within this self-administration, the 
Federal Joint Committee (GBA) is the highest decision-making body at 
federal level, composed of these federal associations.
The Federal Ministry of Health is advised by a number of permanent or 
temporary expert committees. Permanent committees are the Advisory 
Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System 
and the Joint Scientific Council of the Agencies and Institutes, subordi-
nate to the Ministry. Both committees largely consist of scientific experts. 
The Federal Ministry of Health also has administrative oversight of a num-
ber of federal agencies and research institutes, but research commissioned 
directly by the Ministry is limited.
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In contrast, the use of scientific evidence is central for the GBA. Scientific 
evidence plays a key role in many, but not all, decisions of the GBA and 
practices of using evidence are embedded in the rules of procedures set 
out in the GBA’s by-laws. Two research institutes support the work of the 
GBA: The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), 
established in 2004, and the Institute for Quality Assurance and 
Transparency in Health Care (IQTIG), which became operational in 
2016. IQWiG, for instance, is mandated to provide health technology 
assessments and reviews of scientific evidence in relation to the efficacy of 
pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and medical treatment, evidence-based clini-
cal guidelines and patient information.
However, given its broad remit and the diversity of its regulatory tasks, 
scientific evidence will be used in different ways for different types of deci-
sions by the GBA. This will depend on the nature of the issue, the types, 
quality and quantity of studies available, the availability of (international) 
standards of evidence use (e.g. clinical guidelines, health technology 
assessment), and the degree to which the issue affects stakeholder inter-
ests. As a result, decisions concerning the funding of health technologies, 
such as pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and medical treatments are typically 
robustly supported by evidence, while decisions concerning distributional 
issues such as the geographical coverage of physicians in the ambulatory 
sector (i.e. capacity planning) show fewer traces of scientific analysis and 
are more likely to be the product of negotiation between the interest 
groups represented on the committee. However, in contrast to NICE in 
England, decisions concerning the package of service do not utilise evi-
dence of cost-effectiveness as a criterion for funding decisions.
Many other organisations of the self-administration, especially at the 
federal level (e.g. the Sickness Funds, or Federal Association of Physicians), 
have developed their own research capacity and/or are supported by their 
own research institutes. These take a variety of organisational and legal 
forms, and some may be more independent from the organisation com-
missioning the research than others.
Overall, Germany has deeply rooted systems of democratic account-
ability, but the decentralised nature of the state limits the stewardship role 
of the federal government, including the Federal Ministry of Health 
(BMG), to influence health policy and health service governance. As 
health system governance is spread across a number of state and non-state 
actors, there is no single mechanism of decision-making and therefore no 
single entry point for scientific research. Consequently, there are multiple 
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conduits for scientific evidence to enter the policy process, be it in parlia-
ment, federal government, the self-administration and its member organ-
isations, and the legal system; with a large number of research institutes, 
scientific advisory bodies, expert committees and other mechanisms pro-
viding scientific advice. However, there are few formal rules that require 
decision-making to be informed by scientific evidence, with explicit proce-
dures for evidence use in decisions taken by the GBA on inclusions to or 
exclusions from the statutory benefits package being an exception rather 
than a norm.
dIscussIon: Issues and cHallenges
The six countries included in the GRIP-Health programme of work rep-
resent a wide range of health policy contexts – ranging from low to high 
income, covering four continents, and having widely divergent historical 
and political experiences and socioeconomic profiles. However, in all cases 
there are core health systems decisions that need to be made, and struc-
tures in support of providing evidence to inform such decisions. In all 
cases (with the possible exception of Germany), Ministries of health were 
found to be central to these forms of decisions; although we also identified 
situations where decision authority lies outside the Ministry.
From an institutional perspective, we have particularly focussed on the 
evidence advisory systems that inform key health policy decisions in each 
country setting. Each country is of course unique in the historical devel-
opment of its health systems and associated bureaucracy. As such, we 
would not expect evidence advisory systems to necessarily look the same 
across these contexts. Rather, they will have been established, by default or 
design, within pre-existing administrative structures  – products of their 
specific history which shapes the potential directions and features of any 
systems being developed. The ultimate goals of improving health and 
health decision making, however, can be where we look for similarities and 
comparisons. In particular, it can be assumed that, for evidence advisory 
systems to function effectively, they must be able to provide robust and 
high quality syntheses of different forms of evidence, relevant to the spe-
cific policy issue at hand, to the appropriate decision makers or bodies 
responsible for policy decisions which can use them in a timely manner to 
inform relevant health decisions. We can thus reflect, in a comparative 
perspective across case study countries, on the alignment of these systems 
with the decision making needs of the health sector – and of Ministries of 
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Health in particular – given these ministries mandate as stewards of popu-
lation health, and a recognised need for these bodies to use information to 
inform decisions.
Decisions on Packages of Services
One theme we can see arising in multiple countries is the central concern 
across case study countries with the package of health care services to pro-
vide to the public – either through state provided health facilities, or within 
packages of services included in state-regulated insurance programmes. 
Comparing our case studies illustrates some particular issues with the insti-
tutional arrangements in place to supply evidence to inform these decisions. 
It was in our middle income cases (Colombia and Ghana) where the chal-
lenges in the systems to inform such decisions were most visible. Indeed, in 
the lower income settings studied (Ethiopia and Cambodia), local stake-
holders did not raise these decisions as primary concerns in interviews – 
potentially due to the inability to provide comprehensive packages of care 
in the first place. When needs are well beyond resources available, and funds 
for services are highly dependent on both donors and individuals’ out of 
pocket expenditures, there may be little perceived need to have an evidence 
base on which to judge inclusion or exclusion of a formal package of ser-
vices. Alternatively, in our high income settings (England and Germany), 
there were already well established formal systems informing these deci-
sions, albeit very different in structure. There are also notable differences in 
the type of evidence included in such decisions between both countries, 
with NICE in England basing its recommendations on cost effectiveness, a 
criterion which is absent from the German regulatory approach.
In our middle income settings, decisions about the package of health 
services were indeed being made, but without a fully established structure 
to provide evidence to inform such decisions. In Ghana, the National 
Health Insurance Agency (NHIA) has had to decide what to include in its 
service package, yet a national framework for health technology assessment 
(HTA) has not yet been implemented. This is despite the fact that the 
country supported the HTA resolution at the 67th World Health Assembly 
(2014) requiring all countries to work towards Universal Health Coverage 
using HTA as a tool for priority setting. At the time of our fieldwork, the 
country was only piloting HTA as a tool to guide prioritisation decisions 
within the NHIA. So steps are being made, but the evidence advisory sys-
tems needed for particular decisions may not yet be fully formed.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 175
In Colombia there has indeed been a recent attempt to establish a for-
mal Health Technology Assessment body. The local body (IETS) was 
largely modelled on NICE in England, with key personnel from NICE 
involved in the establishment and governance of the body, but its institu-
tional placement and level of influence differs considerably from the 
English body. IETS was not set up with a formal government mandate to 
make decisions for service provision in Colombia, and thus is merely advi-
sory. The insurance based system in Colombia is also very different to the 
English National Health Service, and there appears to be no strong agree-
ment on the appropriateness of using HTA metrics (like cost- effectiveness) 
to make decisions about services in this setting. As Chap. 9 further notes, 
many decisions on health service provision end up being resolved by the 
court system rather than the government.
Use of Routine Data to Guide Decisions
A second theme that arose in our lower and middle income settings were 
issues around how systems work to provide routine data to guide health 
sector decision making. Interestingly, the robustness of the system to use 
such data was not simply a reflection of the income level of the country. 
Indeed, it was Ethiopia that appeared to have a particularly strong empha-
sis on such data, building systems to use it for health sector planning. In 
contrast, capacity issues over data use were raised in Cambodia, along with 
an identified challenge in gathering data from private health providers 
who represent the majority of service provision in the country.
Ghana presented another case to look at how well systems of routine 
data align with decision structures in the country. As detailed in more 
depth in Chap. 4, Ghana has had investment and capacity building in its 
routine data system. However, that chapter further explored how such 
data can end up being used in an institutionalised decision making process 
that has strong donor influence, with international bodies playing a large 
role in the annual processes in which routine data are used to construct 
national indicators that inform the health sector plan. The analysis 
explored how this can result in a parallel system of evidence use and plan-
ning that was outside the normal health sector administrative hierarchy. 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, appeared to more strongly centrally control 
its planning activities, including resisting donor influence as reported in 
our case study.
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In Germany and England, there is substantial infrastructure to collect 
routine data across both health systems, supported by a number of bodies 
created for this purpose. For a long time, data collection in England has 
benefited from an integrated approach applied to the NHS as a whole, 
with Hospital Episode Statistics being a prime example for a comprehen-
sive and systematic approach to data collection across all hospitals in 
England since 1987. In Germany, such systematic data collection tends to 
be a more recent development, as national approaches to data collection 
have typically been afflicted by concerns around the privacy of personal 
data. In recent years, however, efforts have been made to improve the col-
lection of routine data, for example, through the creation of the IQTiG, 
which is mandated with the collection of data on the quality of care across 
the health system.
Health-Issue Specific Decisions
In addition to deciding which health services to provide within national 
service packages, and the use of data to inform sector-wide planning, a 
third key area for evidence use in health policymaking is captured within 
the process of decision making within health-specific programmes. Indeed, 
a great deal of literature on the topic of evidence-informed policymaking 
in the health sector refers to how pieces of evidence can inform health 
issue specific decisions – such as choices between possible interventions. 
For example, we can see literature concerned with improving evidence use 
for malaria (Woelk et al. 2009), for HIV (Auerbach 2008), or for mental 
health decisions (Weisz et al. 2005), amongst others.
Our findings show that the institutional structures to serve these needs 
can be varied. Some countries will have ministerial departments that under-
take research that links to other departments with specific health remits. 
Yet in most cases, evidence to inform decisions on health topics comes 
from outside Ministries of Health. This can come in the form of explicitly 
commissioned research dictated by, or initiated by ministry actors; or alter-
natively provided by external actors – be they research bodies, think tanks, 
international development partners, etc. – who are approaching ministry 
officials and departments or providing evidence of one form or another.
The use of commissioning research as a strategy relies on having resources 
available to do so, but also on actors to value evidence sufficient to commit 
them for this purpose. In many ways, research commissioning by Ministry 
officials may be interpreted positively as it can ensure the policy relevance 
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of evidence generated. Yet heavy reliance on internal commissioning also 
risks narrowing the focus of evidence provision to those issues pre-identi-
fied or preferred by officials, potentially to the detriment of other options 
that have not been considered for any number of political reasons. Yet reli-
ance on outside groups presenting information is not without challenges as 
well. While a much larger number of groups may provide evidence from 
outside official bodies, there is a risk this process is dominated by particular 
well-networked or well-resourced organisations, which can also direct 
political attention using evidence to support a given case. In our aid-depen-
dent settings, as discussed in Chap. 10, there were concerns raised about 
how donor influence shapes the evidence that is created and provided to 
governments at times.
Arm’s Length Public Health Advisory Bodies
Despite the vast differences between country settings, an institutional 
arrangement seen in multiple countries was the establishment of officially 
mandated advisory bodies that sit at ‘arm’s length’ to the Ministry of 
Health. In three cases, this was explicitly a body tasked with providing 
advice in relation to public health: the Ethiopia Public Health Institute, 
the Cambodian National Institute of Public Health, and Public Health 
England were all mentioned as playing such roles to inform policy and 
practice while being placed outside of the Ministry system.
In these three cases of arm’s length public health bodies, we found that 
they all have clear mandates to provide evidence to the decision process 
with appropriate linkages to do so, and in some cases their placement 
appeared to work well to ensure the independence of evidence advice while 
still remaining relevant to local needs (this was not explicitly investigated, 
though, in all cases). The main issue identified, however, related to capac-
ity – with the Ethiopian and Cambodian examples showing serious limita-
tions. In Cambodia, financial constraints were highlighted as a particular 
challenge. So, for example, the ability to raise salary costs by undertaking 
work for non-state actors was noted as a key challenge preventing the 
National Institute of Public Health from achieving greater potential to 
inform and advise the government for policymaking. In Ethiopia, the 
Public Health Institute also faced resource challenges, but these were pre-
sented as related to human capacity. Thus even though a directorate existed 
to provide policy briefs to government, only a handful were produced at 
the time of the fieldwork due to the limited number of staff available.
 MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND THE STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH EVIDENCE 
178 
conclusIons
This chapter began by discussing the stewardship function of ministries of 
health, which provides them with a mandate for improving population 
health, but further can be seen to provide a mandate to shape the evidence 
advisory systems in place to inform health policy. However, when looking 
across a range of countries, with differing contextual features, we see a 
number of ways that such evidence advisory systems may function (or not) 
to meet the needs of health policy making. We can further identify key 
issues related to the ability of Ministries to serve in this stewardship role in 
relation to policy-relevant evidence.
In terms of authority over health policymaking itself, Ministries of 
Health are responsible for many key health decisions in our case study 
countries. Yet there are several instances where the institutional arrange-
ments in place shift key decisions outside of direct Ministerial authority. 
This is perhaps most evident in Germany where the corporatist approach 
to governance means that actors representing the self-administration pos-
sess a good deal of authority to make decisions. As such, ministerial infor-
mation sources in Germany may work in parallel with evidence systems 
informing the corporatist system. In Colombia, on the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court makes fundamental decisions on availability and 
provision of health services and treatments, with clear implications for 
evidence use given the highly technical nature of these decisions (see 
Chaps. 5 and 6). The judicializiation of health policy decisions in this way, 
takes not only decision making but also evidence advisory roles outside 
the control or jurisdiction of the ministry of health in that setting (Hawkins 
and Alvarez Rosete 2017).
Similarly, in settings in which health policy decisions were made within 
the legislative branch (e.g. at parliamentary level), Ministries of Health 
would not necessarily be involved in structuring the systems of evidence 
advice. Public health and health promotion decisions affecting whole pop-
ulations might at times be decided at parliamentary level – for example in 
the UK or in Ghana. Yet there appears to be minimal involvement of min-
istries of health in shaping or informing the evidence advisory systems that 
serve the legislatures in these cases. Again, they appear to be constructed 
in parallel to ministry systems, or outside ministerial jurisdiction. Donor 
influence and control of health decisions in aid-dependent settings could 
lead to further cases where ministries did not have direct control over sys-
tems of evidence provision (explored more in Chap. 10).
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We thus find important limitations to the idea that Ministries of Health 
can serve as comprehensive stewards of systems of health evidence advice, 
as their ability to do so will be strongly shaped by their authority and con-
trol over particular health decision types. That said, we maintain that 
Ministries of Health, in all case country settings, have significant roles and 
responsibilities for health decisions even in cases where certain key health 
topics are addressed in other forums or at different levels of governance. 
We conclude that there is a clear need for both financial and human 
resource capacity to ensure well-functioning evidence advisory systems 
serve the needs of decision makers. That said, capacity was not the only 
issue identified, nor were lower resources always an insurmountable chal-
lenge. Ethiopia’s strength in use and control of routine data sources for 
planning stands out in comparison to Cambodia, which is ranks as having 
a marginally higher national income (World Bank 2017), but which has 
struggled to establish robust data management systems. Ghana has 
invested in its data system, but the institutional systems in place can dictate 
how data were subsequently used to inform health sector planning; with 
findings showing that routine data could end up informing planning sys-
tems greatly influenced by external donors (see Chap. 4). Even in higher 
income settings, we identified issues beyond those of capacity. England 
and Germany demonstrate a high level of scientific expertise and evidence 
advisory capacity, but they rely on differing mixes of systems, agencies, 
and bodies. The generation or synthesis of evidence through  commissioned 
research, or through the convening of advisory groups on an ad- hoc basis, 
may reflect a positive step to ensure evidence is policy relevant, but may 
also lead to evidence only being provided when it is politically expedient 
or for issues which are already on the political agendas.
Comparing countries of varying income levels illustrates that the realm 
of government bodies (some at arm’s length, others not) appears much 
more crowded in England and Germany than in our other case study 
countries. This may not be surprising, however, as it is possible that as 
institutional structures evolve over time, there will be increasing numbers 
of organisations, a greater division of work, and potential for higher levels 
of specialisation. While outside the scope of analysis here, there could be 
future work investigating questions around this in more depth – poten-
tially considering levels of capacity and resource; the prominence given to 
evidence to inform decision; and the time and stability required to estab-
lish types of infrastructure arrangements.
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While the World Health Organization has indeed identified Ministries 
of Health as the stewards of their population’s health, decision making 
that shapes health outcomes may be located in a number of forums, with 
only some key decisions taken in Ministries of Health. However, Ministries 
of Health remain central to health policy decisions in all settings. We have 
argued here that understanding when and why policy-relevant evidence 
serves the needs of health decisions requires an explicitly institutional lens 
that can consider the structural arrangements and links between sources 
and providers of evidence and the relevant decision making points. 
Evidence can improve health decisions and outcomes, but only if it is pro-
vided in a comprehensive and timely manner to inform key decisions. 
Ultimately it will be the underlying structures and links of the evidence 
advisory systems in each country that dictate when, how, and how well 
this takes place.
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